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A B S T R A C T
Psychosocial stress is a ubiquitous phenomenon in our society. While acute stress responses are necessary and
adaptive, excessive activation of neurobiological stress systems can predispose an individual to far-reaching
adverse health outcomes. Living in a complex social environment, experiencing stress is not limited to challenges
humans face individually. Possibly linked with our capacity for empathy, we also display the tendency to
physiologically resonate with others’ stress responses. This recently identiﬁed source of stress raises many in-
teresting questions. In comparison to the wealth of studies that have advanced our understanding of sharing
others’ aﬀective states, the physiological resonance of stress has only recently begun to be more closely in-
vestigated. The aim of the current paper is to review the existing literature surrounding the emerging area of
“stress contagion”, “empathic stress” or “stress resonance”, as it has been variably called. After a brief in-
troduction of the concepts of stress and empathy, we discuss several key studies that paved the way for the
merging of empathy with the concept of physiological resonance. We then delineate recent empirical studies
speciﬁcally focusing on the physiological resonance of stress. In the ﬁnal section of this review, we highlight
diﬀerences between these studies and discuss the variability in terminology used for what seems to be the same
phenomenon. Lastly, potential health implications of chronic empathic stress are presented and possible me-
chanisms of physiological stress transmission are discussed.
1. Introduction
The stress response is a healthy and adaptive function in situations
of acute challenge. However, prolonged stress exposure may cause
permanent dysregulation of the neurobiological stress systems, thereby
leading to wear and tear on the body and brain termed allostatic load
(McEwen et al., 2015). The respective physiological changes, speciﬁ-
cally within the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) and hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, have been linked to detrimental health
eﬀects, including cardiovascular, metabolic, autoimmune and mental
diseases (Chrousos, 2009; McEwen, 2008; Sapolsky, 2004). While
chronic stress can undoubtedly arise from traumatic life events, ex-
amining extreme adversity has taken us only so far in understanding
why individuals living in less demanding conditions are also susceptible
to stress-related conditions. One potential explanation is that allostatic
load can accumulate in the presence of non-traumatic but persistent
stressors (Almeida, 2005; DeLongis et al., 1982; Lazarus and Folkam,
1984). Above and beyond the daily hassles experienced ﬁrsthand, stress
can be transmitted between individuals. Understanding this physiolo-
gical resonance of stress may be a key aspect to explaining how the
daily environment, without being traumatic, can signiﬁcantly impact
our health and wellbeing.
In the current paper, we review the newly emerging area of phy-
siological stress resonance. Accordingly, studies were selected if they
examined physiological resonance in two or more individuals, one of
whom was subjected to stress or a stress-like challenge. Studies ad-
dressing resonance with other emotional states such as sadness or pain
were not included (e.g. Harrison et al., 2006; Hein et al., 2011). Also,
research addressing physiological responses to others’ suﬀering, but
without accounting for resonance between the suﬀering target and
empathizing observer, were excluded (e.g. Liew et al., 2003, 2011).
Although not all of the summarized work related physiological stress
resonance to self-report measures of empathy, the original results were
generally discussed in the context of empathy research. Thus, we touch
on three independent research ﬁelds: stress, empathy, and physiological
resonance. While it is beyond the scope of this review to provide a
comprehensive theoretical background on each of these ﬁelds, a brief
synthesis of basic concepts and ideas is given. We begin with an over-
view of the stress system and a deﬁnition of empathy and related terms.
From there, a short history is presented featuring a number of seminal
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neural and peripheral-physiological studies that helped establish the
notion of physiological resonance as an embodied substrate of empathy.
Despite the fact that empathy research has evolved around negative
states such as pain and disgust, the idea of empathy for another’s stress
is quite new. We will review the work of several groups, diﬀerentiating
between studies examining stress resonance within the autonomic
nervous system and the HPA axis. In a ﬁnal section, we address un-
resolved issues in the area of embodied stress research. More speciﬁ-
cally, we will highlight methodological diﬀerences between existing
studies, discuss inconsistencies with regard to terminology, focus on
potential mechanisms or channels of stress transmission, and lastly
point to putative health implications for individuals resonating with
chronically stressed others.
2. Stress
Stress is deﬁned as a state in which an organism’s homeostasis is
threatened (or perceived to be threatened) by external or internal ef-
fects (Chrousos, 2009). Homeostasis is re-established by a complex re-
pertoire of behavioral and physiological adaptive responses. The prin-
cipal end-eﬀectors of the stress system are cortisol, released by the HPA
axis, and the catecholamines norepinephrine and epinephrine, released
by the SNS. These end-eﬀectors regulate behavioral, metabolic, cardi-
ovascular, immune, and gastrointestinal functions, among others
(Chrousos, 2009; McEwen, 2008). An acute stress response is a highly
adaptive cascade of events providing the organism with the necessary
motivation and energy to “ﬁght-or-ﬂight” in the face of adversity
(Cannon, 1915). However, the very mechanisms that are adaptive
short-term may promote pathophysiologic changes when experienced
chronically. This fact is particularly relevant to socially complex species
such as primates that can generate chronic stress for purely psycholo-
gical reasons (Sapolsky, 2004).
3. Empathy and related phenomena
There are many deﬁnitions of empathy and contentious issues in the
ﬁeld of empathy research. Delving into these debates in too much detail
risks losing the focus of the present review. Rather, we present a broad
deﬁnition and then discuss how more narrow views diﬀer with respect
to that deﬁnition. In the process several unresolved issues will be
raised.
The scientiﬁc endeavor to explain how we understand the feelings
of others dates back to the German philosopher Theodor Lipps and his
theory of Einfühlung (“feeling into”). Einfühlung, translated as “em-
pathy” (Titchener, 1909), was suggested to result from the process of
projecting oneself into an object of perception (Lipps, 1903). Following
Lipps’ early philosophical perspective, social psychologists (e.g. Batson,
1991, 2009; Davis, 1994; Eisenberg, 2000; Hatﬁeld et al., 2009;
Hoﬀman, 2000) and social neuroscientists (e.g. de Vignemont and
Singer, 2006; Decety, 2011; Preston and de Waal, 2002) have been
advancing the ﬁeld of empathy. For the most part, researchers either
explicitly claim that empathy is, or involves, sharing of an aﬀective
state between the person initially experiencing that state and a second
person who observes the state in the other. However, the details on
where to place empathy itself within the realm of several related phe-
nomena, and what exactly constitutes empathy diﬀers markedly be-
tween researchers.
Broad accounts describe empathy as a shared emotional experience,
occurring when the perception of an object’s emotional state leads to a
similar emotional state in the subject (e.g. Hoﬀman, 2000; Preston,
2007). According to these broad conceptualizations, empathy is a su-
perordinate category that subsumes phenomena such as emotional
contagion, mimicry, sympathy and perspective taking (Preston and de
Waal, 2002). De Waal and Preston (2017) argue that complex processes
such as empathy are ultimately products of evolution, which have had
many precursors in less cognitively-advanced species. As a result,
humans are endowed with a toolbox of related processes which are
distinguishable but largely inseparable. They argue that focusing on
distinctions between the empathy-related phenomena risks losing sight
of the “functionally integrated whole” (de Waal and Preston, 2017).
As pointed out by Levenson and Ruef (1992), the literature on
empathy deals with several seemingly distinct aspects. First, empathy
research has described the concept as knowing what a person is feeling,
denoting a cognitive aspect. Secondly, empathy has been con-
ceptualized as feeling what a person is feeling, involving a more ex-
periential sharing. Thus, deﬁnitions or research agendas may be biased
toward cognitive empathy (also referred to as perspective taking,
theory of mind, or mentalizing) or emotional empathy (also called
simply empathy, aﬀective empathy, or aﬀect sharing). There is now
quite ﬁrm evidence that both exist and contribute to our ability to
understand others. A meta-analysis of studies has demonstrated over-
lapping networks for what the authors referred to as aﬀective-percep-
tual and cognitive–evaluative empathy (Fan et al., 2011). Distinct re-
sults have also been reported by Singer and colleagues (Kanske et al.,
2015) using a task speciﬁcally designed to tease apart the aﬀective and
cognitive paths to understanding the states of others.
Singer and colleagues have put forth a narrow deﬁnition, with ex-
plicit distinctions made between empathy and related concepts.
Empathy is restricted to the process of inferring the aﬀective state of
another person by generating an isomorphic state in the self, while
realizing that the source of that state lies in the other person and not in
oneself (de Vignemont and Singer, 2006; Singer and Lamm, 2009).
Emotional contagion, in this account, involves aﬀect sharing but does
not require knowledge of the source of the state (i.e. no self-other
distinction). Sympathy, in Singer’s account, refers to an aﬀective state
in an observer that arises from another person’s state but which is not
isomorphic. Finally, in cognitive perspective-taking, the mental state of
another is represented, yet this representation lacks emotional in-
volvement. The implications of how one decides to structure empathy-
related phenomena are substantial.
Do human infants or animals have the capacity for empathy? The
answer to this question depends on how one deﬁnes the concept. If
conscious awareness is necessary, speciﬁcally, if one must be aware that
the origin of an empathic state is a conspeciﬁc, then we would conclude
that neither human infants nor animals are capable of empathy. If, on
the other hand, a broad conceptualization of empathy is held, then both
infants and animals demonstrate empathy-related behavior.
4. Neural mechanisms of empathy
Regardless of the diﬀerences touched upon above, the predominant
mechanistic view of contemporary empathy theories revolves around
the idea of shared neural networks. “Neural resonance” accounts of
empathy are based largely on brain imaging ﬁndings of overlapping
activation patterns when observing or actually experiencing a given
state (Zaki and Ochsner, 2012). Neural resonance has been shown be-
tween the observation and execution of motor tasks, but also in the
somatosensory domain (Keysers et al., 2010) and for visceral states such
as pain and disgust (Lamm et al., 2011; Lamm and Singer, 2010).
Supporting the hypothesized link with empathy, studies have also
provided evidence for an association between questionnaire measures
of trait empathy (Davis, 1983; Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972) and
shared brain networks in the domains of touch (Kuehn et al., 2013),
pain (Singer et al., 2004) and disgust (Jabbi et al., 2007; Wicker et al.,
2003). Decety and Sommerville (2003) point out that the ﬁrst-hand and
vicarious representations observed in brain imaging studies usually do
not fully overlap and suggest this may be important with regard to
allowing individuals to distinguish between oneself and other people.
A formalized account of how such ﬁndings may come about was put
forth in 2002. The perception-action (PA) model of empathy (Preston
and de Waal, 2002) attempts to explain how emotional and mental
states, and possibly physiology, could be shared between individuals.
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Brieﬂy, PA models posit that the neural representations underlying
actions and perceptions are not independent, contrary to earlier
models, which placed cognitive events between perceptual and motor
acts. In PA models, activation of perceptual representations, if attended
to, automatically activates motor representations, and vice versa. PA
models can explain, for example, why observing a facial expression
often results in a highly similar pattern of muscle activity in the ob-
server’s face. Importantly, that eﬀect is proposed to occur automatically
and presumably also initiates the corresponding autonomic patterns
underlying the transmitted state. Thus, PA models have been invoked to
explain many empathy-related phenomena.
From a cellular point of view, a major breakthrough in our under-
standing of how experiences may be shared between individuals came
with the discovery of “mirror neurons” in macaque monkeys by
Giacomo Rizzolatti and colleagues. The team of neurophysiologists
found robust activation of cells in the premotor cortex of an alert
monkey while it observed an experimenter making a grasping move-
ment. Remarkably, the same neurons discharged when the monkey
performed the grasping movement itself (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992).
While mirror neurons have been proposed as the basis of neural re-
sonance and perception action models of empathy, what exactly mirror
neurons do is still intensely debated (Hickok, 2013).
5. Peripheral-physiological resonance of stress
5.1. Examination of autonomic nervous system activity
Peripheral-physiological resonance refers to synchronous patterns
of physiological activation that arise as a result of an observer watching
a target. Compared to neural resonance, it has received relatively little
attention in the domain of empathy research. This is surprising given
that autonomic measures react quickly to aﬀective change, can be re-
corded with high temporal resolution and are relatively inexpensive.
The ﬁrst demonstration of autonomic linkage was conducted with
therapist-patient dyads in studies of psychotherapy (Di Mascio et al.,
1957, 1955) and between members of small peer groups (Kaplan et al.,
1964). However, in these early studies, autonomic linkage was not
conceptually associated with an independent measure of empathic ca-
pacity. Twenty years later, Levenson and Gottman began studying au-
tonomic linkage between spouses during marital conﬂict situations
(Gottman and Levenson, 1985; Levenson and Gottman, 1983). Im-
portantly, the group soon developed a behavioral procedure to assess
participants’ ability to accurately detect the feelings of another person
(Levenson and Ruef, 1992). Observers viewed video sequences of
spouses engaged in naturalistic marital interactions and continuously
rated the aﬀect experienced by a designated target spouse. The ob-
servers’ ratings were then compared to the targets’ actual aﬀective
ratings, which had been previously assessed. Autonomic physiology
(heart rate, skin conductance level, general somatic activity, pulse
transmission time to the ﬁnger and ﬁnger pulse amplitude) was also
recorded and compared for both individuals. For the ﬁrst time, the
physiological linkage between an observer and a target could thus be
related to the observer’s emotional rating accuracy. Results supported
the idea of a peripheral-physiological substrate for empathy. In both
men and women, greater overall physiological linkage between ob-
servers and targets (driven by the sympathetic measures of skin con-
ductance and pulse transmission to the ﬁnger) predicted greater accu-
racy of the observers’ ratings of the targets’ negative aﬀect (Levenson
and Ruef, 1992). Several studies have since demonstrated autonomic
linkage while observing others’ aﬀective states such as sadness or pain
(e.g. Harrison et al., 2006; Hein et al., 2011).
Following Levenson and Ruef’s (1992) study, another 20 years
passed until the topic of peripheral-physiological resonance was taken
up in the context of stress research (see Table 1 for a summary of stu-
dies). In what we deem to be the ﬁrst study of “empathic stress”, “stress
contagion” or “stress resonance”, Ebisch et al. (2012) used non-
intrusive thermal imaging to test whether there was physiological
sharing of autonomic responses (“autonomic contagion” in their words)
when mothers witnessed distress in their children. To induce an eco-
logically valid stressful experience, three-year-old children were ex-
posed to the mishap paradigm, where they were falsely led to believe
they broke a toy provided by the experimenter (Cole et al., 1992).
Behavioral cues conﬁrmed an increase in children’s distress starting
with the mishap (as opposed to the stress-free introduction and playing
phases of the paradigm). Simultaneously, an increase in sympathetic
activation became apparent in both the children and mothers. Sympa-
thetic ﬂuctuations in the mother-child dyads were signiﬁcantly corre-
lated, providing ﬁrst evidence for stress contagion as an embodied
autonomic process. Using similar methodology, Manini et al. (2013)
extended the previous ﬁnding by showing that autonomic contagion is
not limited to mother-child dyads. Albeit less pronounced compared to
mothers, autonomic responses in women correlated with those of un-
known children they were observing during distress.
Waters et al. (2014) provided intriguing evidence for what the au-
thors termed sympathetic “stress contagion” in mother-infant dyads. In
their study, mothers were randomly exposed to either social evaluation
with negative feedback (negative stressor), social evaluation with po-
sitive feedback (positive stressor) or no evaluation while separated from
their infants. Upon reunion, the mothers’ stress levels were transmitted
to the infants such that higher sympathetic activation in the mothers
(measured in terms of pre-ejection period of the heart) triggered higher
heart rate in the infants. This mother-child covariation was strongest
after the experience of a negative stressor and strengthened over time.
Moreover, infants’ behavioral avoidance of the experimenter was
stronger if mothers had experienced (either negative or positive) eva-
luative stress. Unlike in the study by Ebisch et al. (2012), physiological
covariation in Waters and colleague’s paradigm likely developed
without infants’ conscious awareness of the source of their aﬀective
state. Furthermore, infants did not observe the ﬁrst-hand stressor itself.
Stress-induced changes in mothers’ facial expression, vocal tone, pro-
sody, posture, odor and touch were all suggested as possible channels
through which stress may have been communicated from mother to
child (Waters et al., 2014).
In subsequent work, Waters et al. (2017) revisited the topic of aﬀect
and stress contagion, with an additional focus on the mechanism of
transmission. Using a similar experimental setup, sympathetic and
parasympathetic covariation between mothers and infants were as-
sessed after either social evaluation with negative feedback (negative
stressor) or the induction of a low arousal positive state (relaxation) in
the mothers. As a possible pathway of transmission, the opportunity for
physical contact between the mothers and infants upon reunion was
experimentally manipulated. Suggesting that a low-arousal positive
state can also be shared, parasympathetic covariation between mothers
and infants was stronger when mothers experienced relaxation as op-
posed to negative stress. Surprisingly, the manipulation of touch had no
inﬂuence on parasympathetic covariation. On the other hand, and
consistent with the author’s prior results, sympathetic covariation was
found to be stronger when mothers experienced negative stress rather
than relaxation. The manipulation of touch played a signiﬁcant role for
sympathetic covariation, albeit only in dyads with stressed mothers.
While stress contagion occurred regardless of mother-infant touch, the
strength of sympathetic covariation was greater, and increased over
time, if the infants were held by their mothers. Without the possibility
of mother-infant touch, sympathetic covariation in the stressed dyads
decreased over time. On a behavioral level, infants whose mothers
completed the relaxation task were rated by the experimenter as more
comfortable than infants whose mothers were exposed to negative
stress. Overall, these results support the idea that touch is an important
pathway via which sympathetic stress activation is transmitted and
synchronization is maintained. Touch does not seem to be necessary for
sympathetic resonance to arise in the ﬁrst place, however. Also, para-
sympathetic resonance seems to operate diﬀerently than sympathetic
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resonance.
In another recent study, Dimitroﬀ et al. (2017) showed that the
phenomenon of “stress contagion”, investigated in adult dyads, may be
more complex than previously recognized. The authors tested the ex-
tent to which observers’ cardiac responses were associated with the
cardiac responses of stressed targets displayed via pre-recorded video.
Further, they tested whether this relationship was dependent on levels
of self-reported empathy in the observers (assessed with the Ques-
tionnaire of Cognitive and Aﬀective Empathy; Reniers et al., 2011).
Videos depicted targets speaking in three conditions: without exposure
to a social stressor (no stress), during a social stressor (stress) or after
experiencing a social stressor (recovery). Cardiac activity for both ob-
servers and targets was recorded on a beat-to-beat basis (inter-beat
interval) allowing the determination of autonomic contagion with high
temporal resolution. While observers exhibited distinct patterns of
cardiac reactivity depending on the observation condition, the direction
of eﬀects was unexpected. More speciﬁcally, the inter-beat-interval
remained at baseline when observers viewed non-stressed targets, in-
creased (i.e., heart-rate slowed down) when viewing overtly stressed
targets and decreased (i.e., heart-rate increased) when observing the
recovery condition. In line with previous literature (Lang et al., 1993),
the authors suggest the cardiac deceleration when observing others’
stress may be indicative of a freezing response. Neither the stress con-
dition deceleration, nor the recovery condition acceleration were re-
lated to self-reported aﬀective empathy (i.e., sharing another’s aﬀect)
or cognitive empathy (i.e., representing the state of another through
top-down processes). Also, despite the condition-wise eﬀects, the tar-
gets’ actual stress levels were not predictive of the degree of cardiac
contagion. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the level of observers’
aﬀective empathy predicted the time required to reach maximum cor-
relation with the target in the stress recovery condition. In other words,
participants who reported being more aﬀectively empathetic synchro-
nized with the targets’ cardiac rhythm faster than participants scoring
lower in trait aﬀective empathy.
In summary, studies employing autonomic measures have re-
peatedly demonstrated stress contagion between individuals. There
appear to be diﬀerent mechanisms of transmission (e.g. touch and vi-
sual) and variability of results depending on the type of state induced,
the context and the speciﬁc physiological indices employed. We now
move to studies including measurements of endocrine stress reactivity.
5.2. Examination of hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis activity
The term stress is used in many ways, however in stress research its
deﬁnition is quite strict. Beyond the requirement of SNS system acti-
vation as an unspeciﬁc sign of general arousal, stress experience re-
quires activation of the HPA axis, resulting in cortisol release
(Chrousos, 2009; Hellhammer et al., 2009). Thus, true stress contagion
or empathic stress should also involve resonance of cortisol activity.
The ﬁrst study to investigate the physiological resonance of stress at the
level of the endocrine system was published by Buchanan and collea-
gues in 2012. Salivary cortisol and alpha-amylase (a marker of sym-
pathetic activity; Nater and Rohleder, 2009) were measured simulta-
neously in both the stressed targets and observing committee members
of the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; Kirschbaum et al., 1993). The TSST
is a standardized laboratory task in which participants perform a free
speech and mental arithmetic task while allegedly being video- and
audio-recorded, as well as evaluated by a panel of one or more com-
mittee members. The committee members are part of the research team
and trained to withhold any social engagement or positive feedback,
thereby creating an element of social-evaluative threat. Demonstrating
“empathic resonance of stress", Buchanan et al. (2012) found that ob-
servers (i.e., committee members) showed increases in cortisol release
that were proportional to the cortisol release of the stressed targets (i.e.,
participants). Moreover, observers’ cortisol responses were positively
associated with their own aptitude for empathic concern and
perspective taking, as measured by a multidimensional trait empathy
index (Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 1983). Lastly, observers’
cortisol responses were unrelated to targets’ alpha-amylase release or
self-reported aﬀect. With respect to sympathetic resonance, stress-in-
duced alpha-amylase release was uncorrelated between observers and
targets. Interestingly, however, observers’ alpha amylase levels were
positively associated with their own empathic concern and perspective
taking, and correlated with targets’ self-reported aﬀect.
Taken together, Buchanan and colleagues results suggest that both
the endocrine and sympathetic dimensions of stress resonate with em-
pathic observers, but tap into diﬀerent systems. Observers’ cortisol re-
sponses resonate with targets’ cortisol levels, but their sympathetic
responses resonate with the targets’ self-reported aﬀect. While some of
the endocrine activation, and even the resonance, in the committee
members may have originated from ﬁrst-hand stress as a result of ac-
tively stressing out another individual, this study provided the ﬁrst
demonstration of “full-blown” physiological stress resonance im-
plicating both HPA axis and sympathetic reactivity.
Our own work extended Buchanan’s by diﬀerentiating between two
aspects of what we referred to as “empathic stress” (Engert et al., 2014):
vicarious and resonant. More speciﬁcally, vicarious stress was sug-
gested to develop through the projection of the observer’s own per-
spective onto the target. Accordingly, an observer who appraises the
target’s situation as stressful would mount a cortisol stress response
irrespective of the target’s actual state. In stress resonance, on the other
hand, the observer was suggested to explicitly share the target’s stress
response. Thus, as was the case in Buchanan’s study, observer’s and
target’s stress-induced cortisol release would be proportional to one
another. To test this, and several potential modulatory factors of em-
pathic stress, we systematically manipulated the familiarity between
observers and targets (partners vs. strangers), as well as the modality of
observation (real-life vs. virtual) and the observer sex (male vs. female).
In the real-life observation modality, observers watched the TSST
through a one-way mirror. In the virtual observation modality, they
watched via live video feed. In all cases, observers watched an opposite-
sex target being stressed. We assessed salivary cortisol, alpha-amylase
and heart rate simultaneously in both dyad members. The study results
revealed that overall, 26% of observers showed empathic stress (i.e.,
vicarious or resonant) in terms of a physiologically relevant cortisol
increase of at least 1.5 nmol/l above baseline levels (Miller et al., 2013).
Empathic cortisol stress responses were more pronounced in partners
than strangers (40% vs 10%) and in the real-life representation of the
stressful situation compared to the video feed (30% vs 24%), but not
restricted to these conditions. Actual cortisol stress resonance, however,
emerged primarily in partners and in the real-life representation of the
stressful situation. Sex had no inﬂuence on either aspect of the em-
pathic cortisol stress response. Our measure of self-reported empathy
inﬂuenced both vicarious and resonant stress. Vicarious cortisol re-
sponses were positively associated with state empathic concern, while
resonant responses were associated with trait and state empathic con-
cern, trait perspective taking, trait fantasy and state personal distress.
Alpha-amylase and heart rate, as markers of sympathetic arousal, only
partially mirrored the cortisol results. While vicarious sympathetic
arousal was stronger in emotionally close observer-target dyads and the
real-life observation modality, unlike cortisol, there was no evidence for
sympathetic resonance. Neither sex nor self-reported trait or state em-
pathy had an inﬂuence on the sympathetic domain of either vicarious or
resonant empathic stress.
The results of our study nicely replicated Buchanan et al.’s (2012)
ﬁnding of cortisol stress resonance. We further demonstrated that ob-
servers can be entirely passive witnesses of others’ stress, and that ob-
servers are prone to resonate stronger when emotionally close to a
target, when observing the stressful situation in person, and when ex-
hibiting higher self-reported empathy. Our results are also consistent
with Buchanan’s in terms of the speciﬁcity of the endocrine vs. sym-
pathetic domains of empathic stress. More speciﬁcally, both studies
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show it is rather the cortisol than the sympathetic responsiveness that
links individuals during stress. Overall, the emerging research suggests
that the family unit – providing maximal emotional and spatial close-
ness between individuals – would seem to oﬀer ideal conditions for the
emergence of stress resonance.
While highly controlled laboratory experiments are critical, natur-
alistic methods may provide a truer reﬂection of relationship processes
(Laurenceau and Bolger, 2005; Scollon et al., 2003). In a follow-up
study (Engert et al., 2018), we therefore investigated the ecological
validity of laboratory-induced cortisol stress resonance. We tested
whether an individual's tendency to synchronize to their partner's acute
cortisol stress response is related to their degree of everyday diurnal
cortisol covariation. A sub-sample of 44 opposite-sex couples involved
in the aforementioned empathic stress protocol (Engert et al., 2014)
provided diurnal cortisol samples over the course of two non-con-
secutive weekdays. Partner presence at the time of saliva self-sampling
was assessed. Of those 44 couples, all men had previously held the role
of the target, and all women that of the observer when participating in
the empathic TSST. We found that diurnal cortisol levels of male and
female partners were positively associated, and that the degree of
cortisol stress resonance during the TSST was linked to the strength of
the inter-couple diurnal cortisol covariation. In detail, women with
higher stress resonance, i.e., synchronized release of cortisol when
passively witnessing their partners undergo stress in the laboratory,
also exhibited greater inter-couple diurnal cortisol covariation in their
daily lives. Whether partners were physically together when taking a
cortisol sample had no inﬂuence on inter-couple covariation. Next to
showing that stress resonance in the laboratory has ecological validity,
these results suggest that our daily endocrine functioning reﬂects not
only our own experiences. Rather, our diurnal cortisol rhythm is in-
ﬂuenced by those close to us, particularly for individuals prone to
empathically synchronize with their partner in situations of acute
stress.
Related studies investigating cortisol synchrony in daily life, albeit
without considering empathy per se, deserve mentioning here.
Signiﬁcant diurnal cortisol correlations have been reported in families
with adolescent children, where the within-family synchrony was found
to increase in moments of heightened negative aﬀect (Papp et al.,
2009). Coregulation of cortisol and negative mood has also been shown
in adult couples, where higher covariation in mood ﬂuctuations was
linked to higher covariation in cortisol (Saxbe and Repetti, 2010). Pratt
et al. (2017) reported stronger adrenocortical synchrony in mother-
child dyads as a function of the children’s diurnal cortisol secretion,
with greater synchrony associated with higher cortisol. They suggest
this may indicate that higher childhood stress increases susceptibility to
the inﬂuences of maternal physiological stress. However, it seems
equally likely that mothers of stressed children might themselves tune
into their children out of concern. Although these studies did not spe-
ciﬁcally induce or even target stress, they indicate that resonance in
daily life HPA axis activation of close conspeciﬁcs is particularly pro-
nounced when negative aﬀect is increased.
6. Issues and outlook
6.1. Inconsistencies between studies
The delineated studies have in common that physiological activity
was assessed simultaneously in observers and targets after experimental
stress induction tasks. However, methodologies diﬀered quite sig-
niﬁcantly between studies, raising the question of whether distinct
types of physiological stress resonance may have been captured.
Regarding the relationship of the tested dyad, for example, physiolo-
gical stress resonance in strangers may serve as a warning of imminent
danger, allowing the observer to seek safety. Physiological stress re-
sonance between mother-child or partner dyads may, in addition, serve
the function of strengthening the dyad’s bond and/or providing the
observer with the necessary energy to support the target.
The role of the observer presumably also aﬀects the emerging type
of physiological stress resonance. In everyday life we are rarely re-
stricted to an exclusively observing role. Thus, whether we are in a
position to help the stressed target, be it by means of speaking or
concrete actions, or whether we are directly involved in eliciting the
target’s stress may be of critical importance for the resulting nature of
physiological resonance. On that note, the role of the observer diﬀers
considerably in the study by Buchanan et al. (2012) compared to all
other studies. Here, observers (the TSST committee members) were not
passive witnesses of targets’ suﬀering but, in fact, actively induced it.
Therefore, physiological synchrony may have reﬂected the extent to
which committee members were stressed themselves by having to in-
duce stress in the target – the more so, the more the target was visibly
aﬀected by the TSST.
Studies also diﬀered substantially with respect to the potential
mechanisms of transmission between target and observer. Being in
physical contact with a stressed target, as in the studies by Waters and
colleagues, raises the possibility that the somatosensory system plays a
role in transference of stress-related states. However, there are clearly
other pathways. Observing another’s stress visually, in person through a
one-way mirror or distantly via video transmission, all triggered stress
resonance. Whether diﬀerent modes of transference activate the same
or diﬀerent branches of the stress system is a question which needs to
be addressed. It is noteworthy that perception/action models would
suggest that any sensory modality that activates stress-associated re-
presentations should also trigger the corresponding physiological pat-
terns underlying those associations.
Overall, future studies should begin to examine whether, next to the
strength of a synchronized physiological response, patterns of sympa-
thetic, parasympathetic and endocrine resonance diﬀer systematically
depending on the investigated type of dyadic relationship, role of the
observer, or mode of observation or transmission. In order to actually
reveal such subtle systematic diﬀerences in physiological responding, it
may be critical to assess pure measures of either sympathetic (e.g., pre-
ejection period) or parasympathetic activation (e.g. high frequency
heart rate variability).
6.2. Terminology
Terminology in the area of empathy research seems to have been an
issue right from the start (Batson, 2009; Levenson and Ruef, 1992). The
current review clearly illustrates that diﬀerent authors use diﬀerent
names for what could be the same phenomenon. For example, Ebisch
et al. (2012), Waters et al. (2014, 2017) and Dimitroﬀ et al. (2017) refer
to autonomic or stress contagion, Buchanan et al. (2012) to the em-
pathic physiological resonance of stress, and we (Engert et al., 2014) to
vicarious or resonant empathic stress (see Table 1 for a summary of the
utilized terms). Yet, in each study (except Waters’), the responses of
adult observers to a target’s acute stress response during a standardized
psychosocial laboratory stressor were examined.
The diﬀerences in terminology are most easily explained by diﬀer-
ences in the underlying deﬁnitions of empathy adopted. However, if
explicit deﬁnitions are not provided it becomes exceedingly diﬃcult to
determine whether conceptualizations within the research area are in
agreement or not. One key distinction among the deﬁnitional ap-
proaches to empathy, for example, is whether they consider empathy to
encompass (e.g. Preston and de Waal, 2002) or be distinct from phe-
nomena such as emotional contagion, sympathy and perspective taking
(de Vignemont and Singer, 2006; Singer and Lamm, 2009). Holding the
former point of view would allow one to label the same phenomenon as
both contagion and empathy, whereas the latter view would insist it
cannot be both simultaneously.
Another important aspect that diﬀers across deﬁnitions of empathy
or related concepts is the requirement that the observer be aware of the
empathic process taking place. The question of whether observers are
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aware of sharing the targets’ feelings of stress has not been explicitly
addressed to date. However, the studies by Waters et al. (2014, 2017)
testing infants that likely lacked the conceptual understanding of what
was happening, would suggest awareness is not essential for stress
transmission to arise. This, in turn, raises the question of whether the
infants’ responses to their mothers’ stress should be considered em-
pathic. Notably, the authors refer to their eﬀects as stress contagion, not
empathic stress. Generally, there seems to be consensus that “con-
tagion” is a low-level or bottom-up process, which precludes the ne-
cessity of conscious awareness. The term “emotional contagion”, for
example, has been used by Hatﬁeld et al. (1993) to indicate a largely
non-conscious process whereby one person quickly and automatically
catches the emotional state of another. Similarly, de Waal and Preston
(2017) suggest conscious awareness is an aspect of top-down empathic
processes such as perspective taking that rely more on reasoning or
conceptual knowledge than the quick, automatic, bottom-up empathic
processes such as contagion. The same rational (i.e., that awareness is
not a necessary condition for stress transmission to arise) applies to
recent animal studies showing that behavioral, autonomic, endocrine
(Carnevali et al., 2017) and even synaptic changes (Sterley et al., 2018)
similar to those found in actively stressed mice can be automatically
transmitted to naïve conspeciﬁcs.
The issue of whether there needs to be awareness of the transmis-
sion process is further complicated by the fact that stress transmission
following a laboratory paradigm may diﬀer from empathy-dependent
covariation of stress-reactive systems in everyday life. While it seems
likely that the blatancy of the laboratory situation boosts the observer’s
awareness of sharing another’s experience, cortisol covariation in ev-
eryday life (which exists independent of whether two individuals are
physically together when taking their respective cortisol samples;
Engert et al., 2018), may be less conscious. Furthermore, it is possible
that a given subject may be aware of the source of resonant stress in one
instance but unaware under slightly diﬀerent circumstances, depending
on where attention is deployed. Thus, using conscious awareness as a
criterion, it would seem possible to label the same phenomenon “em-
pathic” in one situation and “non-empathic” in another, despite the
same underlying mechanisms.
Ultimately, as plainly stated by Batson (2009), there is “…no clear
basis – either historical or logical – for favoring one labeling scheme
over another. The best one can do is recognize the diﬀerent phenomena,
make clear the labeling scheme one is adopting, and use that scheme
consistently.” We suggest that future studies explain their respective
naming choice so that in the long run and with growing knowledge of
the phenomenon, a more consistent terminology can be established.
6.3. Potential implications of the physiological resonance of stress
At the most broad level, physiological resonance can be viewed as
form of non-verbal communication with a host of implications for both
the observer and target. Likely, ﬁrst-hand and resonant phenomena also
share a purpose. The function of a ﬁrst-hand stress response is to pro-
vide the organism with the necessary motivation and energy to “ﬁght-
or-ﬂight” in the face of adversity (Cannon, 1915). Similarly, physiolo-
gical stress resonance may serve an adaptive function by allowing the
silent transmission of threat from one individual to another. Con-
sequent central and peripheral changes such as increased arousal, vig-
ilance and oxygenation of brain, heart and skeletal muscles (Chrousos,
2009) would thus enable the empathic observer to escape adversity, or
alternatively, help the distressed target. As has been suggested for the
general human ability to share another’s aﬀective state (Butler, 2011;
Hatﬁeld et al., 1993), physiological resonance may also be critical to
facilitate social connection and coordination.
Given the severe health consequences of long-term stress system
activation (Chrousos, 2009; McEwen, 2008; Sapolsky, 2004), scenarios
are conceivable where physiological stress resonance would turn ma-
ladaptive, however. Humans experience maximal emotional and spatial
closeness, and hence the ideal conditions for stress resonance, in their
family unit. Children or partners caught in a stress-charged family en-
vironment may accordingly be at risk of detrimental health eﬀects
following long-term stress resonance and associated physiological over-
activation. While the health consequences of long-term stress resonance
remain to be investigated, a survey by the American Psychological
Association illustrates clearly that children are aware of and emotion-
ally suﬀer from their parents’ stress. The vast majority of children and
teenagers are saddened, worried or frustrated by their parents’ stress,
and children who perceive their parents as constantly stressed are more
likely to report being stressed themselves (American Psychological
Association, 2010).
There is much work to be done in this newly solidifying area of
physiological stress resonance, with the great potential for making a
signiﬁcant impact. Future studies should investigate the link between
susceptibility for stress resonance (e.g. high cortisol stress resonance in
the laboratory, high-stress family environment) and health. Next to
examining typical health markers like low grade inﬂammation, meta-
bolic indices and psychological wellbeing, it would be intriguing to test
whether the typically ﬂat diurnal cortisol proﬁles associated with
chronic stress exposure (Miller et al., 2007) are reﬂected in the partners
and children of chronically stressed individuals.
While studying the health consequences of stress resonance has
obvious importance, we may be able to learn from investigating in-
dividuals who do not show resonance. For example, those who fail to
resonate may lack empathy, but they may likewise deploy a protective
strategy in the face of adversity. Notwithstanding the positive aspects of
empathy, it can also lead to burnout and exhaustion, and bias moral
decision-making (Bloom, 2017). An interesting alternative to help
overcome such negative side-eﬀects of empathy may be the Buddhist
concept of compassion, deﬁned as the feeling of concern for the suf-
fering of others associated with the motivation to help (Keltner and
Goetz, 2007). Unlike the training of empathy, training compassion was
shown to strengthen the activation of brain networks implicated in
aﬃliation and reward, and promoted prosocial behavior rather than
empathic distress (Klimecki et al., 2013, 2014). Moreover, compassion
training reduced acute stress reactivity to ﬁrsthand stress (Engert et al.,
2017). In going beyond the excessive sharing of negative aﬀect that is
linked to empathy, training compassion may endow the individual with
the ability to foster positive aﬀect, to help, yet not become burdened by
the hardship of others.
6.4. Mechanisms of stress transmission
There has been a call for research to move beyond the examination
of whether contagion of aﬀective states occurs, to how it occurs
(Timmons et al., 2015). Indeed, understanding the mechanisms of
empathic transmission processes would be a prerequisite for the future
prevention of harmful stress resonance. Thus far, only two studies have
explicitly addressed the topic of how stress can be transferred (which is
also discussed in some detail in a review by White and Buchanan,
2016). In their 2017 study, Waters et al. showed that touch is an im-
portant channel of autonomic stress contagion between mother and
infant. In all other reviewed studies, the investigated dyads were se-
parated throughout the testing procedure. Thus, touch is clearly not the
only mechanism of transmission. By comparing the one-way mirror and
video feed conditions in our study (Engert et al., 2014), we could assess
whether the surrounding context or the facial detail of the transmitted
information had an inﬂuence on stress resonance. While the one-way
mirror allowed for integration of multifaceted contextual information
(including body posture, motion and visual presence of the committee),
the video feed presented close-up recordings of the targets’ faces al-
lowing more detail of facial expression to be gleaned. We found that
cortisol stress resonance in the total sample of 211 stranger and partner
dyads was stronger in the one-way mirror condition, when multiple
stress-related cues could be processed. However, when focusing on only
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44 partner dyads (Engert et al., 2018), the video condition was equally
permissive for cortisol resonance. This may indicate that partners have
learned to interpret each other's facial expressions and can therefore
make optimal use of the subtle stress cues transmitted in the video (e.g.
pupil dilation, blushing, sweating) to accurately assess and resonate
with their partners’ state. When observing a stranger, on the other
hand, it seems context is important to facilitate a ﬁne-tuned empathic
response.
Although the question of transmission was not explicitly addressed
in our study on inter-couple diurnal cortisol covariation (Engert et al.,
2018), it is intriguing to note that covariation between partners was not
modulated by partners’ current togetherness (i.e., covariance occurred
whether or not partners were physically together when taking a cortisol
sample). In this daily context it seems likely that cues transmitted via
vocal tone and prosody during phone calls would play a central role in
the process of stress transmission.
7. Conclusion
In sum, it has been established that the physiological resonance of
stress includes both the sympathetic nervous system and the HPA axis.
It is conceivable that such second-hand stress could become chronic,
leading to accumulation of allostatic load and ultimately detriment of
health, particularly when coupled with one’s own ﬁrst-hand stress ex-
periences. Eﬀorts should be made to elucidate the underlying me-
chanisms of stress transmission (e.g. facial expression, vocal tone,
prosody, posture, odor and context). Ultimately, it may be possible to
shield oneself from the adverse eﬀects of stress resonance, yet remain
close and supportive of stressed loved ones.
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